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THE SKY IS FALLING 
Managing Space Objects 
William B. Wirin* 
For presentation at the XXXV Congress of the International Astronautical 
Federation Colloquium on Cooperation in Space to be held b~ the International 
Institute of Space Law during the Congress of the Internatlonal Astronautical 
Federation, October 8-13, 1984, Lausanne, Switzerland. 
The opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the Author 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the 
Department of the Air Force, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Space 
Command, or the United States Government. 
Abstract 
All countries who launch space vehicles need to 
focus their attention on steps necessary to prevent 
damage to mankind by space objects. The 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty outlines a nation's liability but not 
the prevention of such damage. Nuclear po~er 
sources (NPS), in particular, demand speclal 
procedures and precautions. This paper will 
discuss the reentry into the earth's atmosphere of 
radioactive materials (such as occurred with COSMOS 
954 and COSMOS 1402), the catalogue of space 
objects maintained by NORAD, and measures which 
should be taken to avoid damage to or by space 
objects and debris. The space catalogue presents 
the opportunity to avoid disaster. 
COSMOS 954 
0653 Eastern Standard Time January 24, 1978 was a 
milestone in the evolution of space law--COSMOS 
954's orbit reached final decay, marking the first 
time that nuclear mater i a 1 wou 1 d reenter the 
earth's atmosphere from space and stri ke the 
earth's surface. Soon after COSMOS 954' s reentry, 
radioactive material was detected by Canada in the 
sparsely inhabited area southeast of the Great 
Slave Lake and radioactive debris was scattered 
over 124,000 square kilometers in the Northwest 
Territories. This event brought into play the 
previously untested Convention on I~ternational 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space ObJects. 1 
Very suddenly, almost six years after the Liability 
Convention was signed, its provisions would be put 
to the test. Article II of the Liability 
Convention provides that, "A launching state shall 
be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage 
caused by its space objects on the surface of the 
earth." In the Convention, "damage" is defined in 
Article I(a) as meaning, "loss of life, personal 
injury, or other impairment of health; all loss of 
or damage to property of states or. of per~ons, 
natural or juridical, or property of lnternatlOnal 
intergovernmental organizations. 2 This particular 
*Juris Doctor, Staff Judge Advocate, HQ North 
American Aerospace Defense Command, HQ Aerospace 
Defense Command and HQ Space Command, Co lorado 
Springs Color~do USA; Member, International 
Institute of Space Law (lISL), American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), American 
Bar Association committees: Forum Committee on Air 
and Space Law, and International Law Division. 
This paper is declared a work of the U.s. 
Government and therefore is in the public domain. 
146 
incident did not pose any definitional problems of 
"launching state" or whether COSMOS 954 was a 
"space object." The term "damage" as used in the 
Convention, however, does not specify injury 
resulting from nuclear radiation. It is 
interesting to note that four years earl ier A. 1. 
Ioyrysh, a Soviet writer, observed, "The Convention 
appl ies to all kinds of damage including nuclear 
damage. 3 
COSMOS 954 caused some damage by destroyi ng trees 
and vegetation, but the primary damage was the 
radioactive residue. It was indeed fortunate that 
the area was not inhabited and that there was no 
loss of 1 ife or personal injury. Within minutes 
after COSMOS 954 impacted, the Government of the 
United States made an offer of assistance to help 
the Canadian authorities with their emergency 
operations. This offer was accepted and Operation 
Morninglight began and did not end until over three 
months later on April 17, 1978. In order to 
preclude possible impairment of health, the 
Canadian Government went to great lengths to remove 
all radioactive material plus flora and soils that 
had become radioactively contaminated. The total 
cost amounted to $13,970,143.66 (CDN). 
COSMOS 954 had been launched by the USSR on 
September 18, 1977. The Sov i ets descr i bed its 
official objective as the exploration of outer 
sp ace. Some authors have conc 1 uded, however, that 
it was a satellite whose purpose was to support the 
Soviet ocean surveillance program. 4 The initial 
contact by the Canadian Government to the USSR was 
on January 24, 1978 by the Department of External 
Affairs which expressed surprise to the Ambassador 
that the Government of Canada had not previously 
been notified of the possible reentry of the 
satellite into the earth's atmosphere over Canada. 
Additionally, the Ambassador was queried whether 
there was a nuclear reactor on board and asked for 
an urgent response. 
Later that day the Ambassador of the USSR advised 
that the satellite had been expected to reenter the 
earth's atmosphere in the area of the Aleutian 
Islands. "In case it did not burn out completely 
in the atmosphere ••. there should not be any sizable 
hazard and that in places of impact there could 
only be insignificant local pollution requiring 
very limited measures of disactivation." The 
construction of the nuclear reactor on board the 
sate 11 ite was des i gned so that it wou 1 d be 
destroyed by reentry through the dense 1 ayers of 
the atmosphere. 5 The Ambassador expressed the 
Soviet Union's readiness to render urgent 
assistance to ameliorate the possible adverse 
circumstances and remove any remains of the 
satell ite. The Canadi an Government rejected the 
offer of assistance and again asked for answers as 
to the nature of the nuclear reactor on board the 
satellite. In response to Canadian inquiries, the 
Soviet Union on March 21, 1978 stated that, "The 
power unit of the COSMOS 954 satellite was an 
ordinary nuclear reactor working on uranium 
enr i ched wi th an isotope of Uran i um-235 .•• The 
reactor's act i ve zone was a set of heat-emitt i ng 
elements with a Ber yll i um refl ector." I n its fur-
ther note of May 31, 1978, the Soviets added, "The 
Beryllium reflector included six moving elements 
that have already been found (one by Canadian 
authorities) and several tens of rods of 
cyl indrical form." The United States Department of 
Energy concluded, "It was thought to be a 
100-kilowatt or less reactor estimated to contain 
in the order of 50 kg of highly enriched U-235.,,6 
Operation Morningl ight was continued by Canada and 
United States authorities until they were certain 
they had located and retrieved all radioactive 
material that survived reentry into the earth's 
atmosphere. 
THE CLAIM 
The Canadian Government took the unusual step of 
making public its claim and cost incurred by itJ 
I t argued under the L i ab il i ty Convent i on that the 
Soviet Union, the 1 aunching state, was absolutely 
liable. The Soviet Union was not interested in the 
return of any of the debri s so as to avo i d the 
provisions of the 1968 Rescue Treaty. Under 
Article 5, paragraph 5, "expenses incurred in 
fulfilling obligations to recover and return a 
space object or its component parts under 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be borne 
by the launching authority." Both paragraphs 2 and 
3 provide for the launching state to "request" 
assistance before an obl igation arises to "take 
such steps as it finds practicable to recover the 
object or component parts". 8 The essence of the 
position on this treaty was that by notifying 
Canada it did not seek return of the debris; the 
USSR avoided the financial obligations imposed. 
The Soviets observed in their note number 37 of May 
31, 1978 "that the radiation situation over the 
entire examined territory judging by the level of 
external radiation could be recognized as 
practically safe for population. In similar 
conditions further search on the Soviet Union's 
territory would evidently be discontinued.,,9 The 
Soviets maintained that they had a duty to 
participate in the search and recovery of the 
debris of the satell ite and were disappointed at 
not being afforded the opportunity. Article XXI of 
the Liability Convention provides that a launching 
state shall, upon request, exami ne the poss i b i 1 ity 
of rendering appropriate and rapid assistance when 
the damage caused presents a 1 arge- sca 1 e danger. 
However, the article specifically provides that 
nothing in the article shall affect the rights and 
obligations of the state's parties. 10 Article 5, 
paragraph 4, of the Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, The Return of Astronauts, and the 
Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space 
provides that a State discovering hazardous or 
deleterious material within its territories "may so 
notify the launching authority, which shall imme-
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diately take effective steps" to eliminate possible 
danger.!1 Thus while a duty of assistance can 
arise because of the word "may," it is only after a 
request has been made by the injured state. In no 
way does the failure of an injured state to request 
or permit assistance lessen the liability of the 
launching country. 
Although the total cost amounted to $13,970,143.66 
(CON), Canada decided to seek only incremental 
expenses. That is, costs that would not have been 
incurred had the incident not taken place. Thus, 
the salaries of military and public servants 
involved in Operation Morninglight were not 
included although overtime, transportation, and 
maintenance costs incurred by them as a direct 
result of the operation were included. The claim 
brought against the Soviet Union amounted, then, to 
$6,041,174.70 (CON). 
Canada and the Soviet Union proceeded to settle the 
claim pursuant to direct negotiations as envisioned 
by Article IX of the Liability Convention. The 
provisions of this article require that a claim 
related to damage caused by space objects should be 
brought to the launching state through diplomatic 
channels. If a settlement through diplomatic 
negot i at ions is not reached after one year, then a 
claims commission may be established. Under 
Article XII, the compensation which the launching 
state shall be liable to pay for damage under this 
Convent i on shall be determi ned in accordance with 
international law and the principles of justice and 
equity, in order to provide such reparation in 
respect of the damage as wi 11 res tore the person, 
natural or juridical, state or international 
organization on whose behalf the claim is presented 
to the condition which would have existed if the 
damage had not occurred. After three rounds of 
diplomatic negotiations, Canada and the Soviet 
Union reached a settlement on November 21, 1980 and 
a formal protocol was signed which provided for 
payment of 3 million Canadian dollars in full and 
final settlement of all matters connected with the 
disintegration of the Soviet satellite COSMOS 954. 
Whether or not that was ample and just compensation 
clearly is debatable. The USSR's position was that 
the cleanup efforts by Canadians were unreasonable 
and were not proportional to the radioactive hazard 
present. Suffice it to say, Article XII relies 
upon international law and the principles of 
justice and equity in determining an appropriate 
compensation--vague terms of reference at best. 
While useful as guides in most instances they are 
less helpful when applied against the uncertain 
effects of radioactivity. What is important is 
that the two States involved were able to resolve 
the liability issues amicably and that it was not 
necessary to resort to a claims commission provided 
for in Article XV or other international procedures 
for the resolution of disputes. 
COSMOS 1402 
Following COSMOS 954, COSMOS 1402, another ocean 
surveillance satellite, began to malfunction in 
late 1982. It had been launched on August 30, 1982 
to search for and track American and allied ships 
with its radar. 12 This satellite, as the previous 
ones in this series, was powered by a nuclear 
reactor. TASS acknowledged on January 15, 1983 
that the fuel elements were made of Uranium-238 
enriched with Uranium-235 and encased with a 
beryllium reflector. In order to preclude reentry, 
as occurred wi th COSMOS 954 wi th a rugged reactor 
housing, the Soviets developed a way to eject the 
fuel core from the reactor. This new safety system 
involved having the satellite split into three 
pieces after the radar ocean surveillance mission 
was completed. Two of the pieces remain in low 
earth orbit while the third, the nuclear reactor, 
is boosted into a higher orbit. COSMOS 1402, 
however, failed to kick the radioactive fuel core 
into a debris storage orbit. The reactor housing 
reentered the earth's atmosphere over the Indi an 
Ocean on January 23, 1983 with the fuel core, 
according to the Soviets, coming down some two 
weeks later on February 7, 1983 in the South 
Atlantic, off the coast of Argentina. Neither Part 
1 or 2 of COSMOS 1402 caused any damage. There 
were no ships in the immediate impact areas and the 
depth of the ocean effectively prevented any 
injury. 
NPS ISSUES 
Clearly it was beneficial for the various states to 
have concluded the L iabil ity Convention. Now, as 
the number of objects in space increases, it is 
necessary for the respective states to come 
together again and devise means of reducing the 
likelihood of damage from space objects falling 
back to earth--particu1ar1y those possessing 
radioactive materia1s. I3 
What then of the risks that nuclear power sources 
pose? I s it then safe to conc1 ude that these 
concerns are now behind us and therefore we should 
turn our attention to more viable space law issues? 
I don't believe so. Past spacecraft have fulfilled 
their missions by and large with one or two 
kilowatts of power; however, the next generat ions 
will call for up to hundreds of kilowatts of 
continuous power plus an effort to reduce volume, 
mass, and cost. Designers will be comparing 
photovoltaic, electrochemical battery systems, and 
nuclear reactors. 14 
While the exact context of this issue remains to be 
seen, Dr. George E. Mueller's words are true: 
"What I can predict with absolute certainty, 
however, is that there will be a great diversity of 
operations in space by the end of the century. And 
we currently lack an accepted set of laws and 
international agreements to effectively deal with 
this new environment. It took centuries to develop 
a comprehensive body of law to govern here on 
Earth. We have perhaps a decade to develop a 
comprehensive and acceptable body of law for 
space."15 
The approaches to the use of nuclear power sources 
lie in the safer use rather than the elusive goal 
of a no-risk regime. 16 
Nuclear power sources offer the advantage of high-
power capacity, long 1 ife, compact size, and the 
abi1 ity to function independently of solar 
radiation. They, however, as we've seen, pose 
significant risk in the event the nuclear fuel 
lands on the earth or other celestial bodies. 
Therefore, their use must take into consideration 
the risks as well as the benefits and achieve a 
balance. In this balancing, three factors must be 
carefully evaluated. First, the essential nature 
of the space mission; second, the existence of 
alternate power sources to accomplish a particular 
purpose~ and third, the maximization of safety 
precaut ions. These are, in turn, compared to the 
potential detriment to mankind through injuries and 
pol itica1 costs. 
Whether or not a given space mission is essential 
is, however, a political question and as such is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it is 
appropriate to observe that if a nation determines 
that a particular space mission is truly essential 
for its pol itica1, mil itary, or economic survival, 
then it will turn to nuclear power sources--
regardless of the other constraints. 
NPS USES 
Turning now to a brief review of power systems, 
nuclear power sources do have their advantages: 
continuous and predictable output of heat, very 
reliable power output in useful wattage ranges, 
long service lifetime, low weight per power output, 
compact structure, adaptability to any spacecraft, 
resistance to radiation and meteorite damage, and 
complete independence from the sun. There are also 
two types of nuclear systems. One is a nuclear 
reactor and the other, which has been more widely 
used by the United States, employs radioisotopes. 
Radioisotopes are unstable and thus undergo a decay 
process which emits energy as heat. Heat is 
converted into energy in various ways, but in the 
US space program dissimilar metals are joined in a 
closed ciruit and the two functions are kept at 
different temperatures producing electric voltage. 
Pluton i um-238 with a ha 1f 1 i fe of 87.7 years is 
used as the heat source in US space missions. 
These radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RT11 have been used by the US on 23 space sys tems. 
Only on one occasion, the SNAP lOA (Systems for 
Nuclear Auxiliary Power), was a nuclear reactor 
used. The Soviet Union is believed to have 
launched at least 19 reconnaissance satellites, 
inc 1 ud i ng COSMOS 954 and COSMOS 1402, powered by 
nuclear reactors. 18 
Solar arrays, fuel cells, and chemical batteries 
each have limitations. Solar arrays work well for 
orbital missions and those moving toward the sun. 
However, as a satellite moves away from the sun, 
the energy developed drops off dramatically making 
sol ar energy impractical. Fuel cells and chemical 
batteries have a 1 imited 1 ife and cannot produce 
great amounts of energy. RTGs are also 1 imited 
because of the direct relationship of weight to 
power output. Bennett and Buden suggest the 
following missions for which nuclear reactors may 
prove to be the optimum power sources: 
Orbital Applications 
Communications system requlrlng only small, 
low power, earth-based transmitters/receivers 
148 
Remote sensing of the earth 
Electrical power supply for a manned space-
based space exploration 
Space Exploration 
Nuclear electrical propulsion 
Electrical power supply for manned or unmanned 
deep space probes 
Electrical power supply for bases establ ished 
on planetary bodies in the distant future 
NPS RISK MANAGEMENT 
Experience teaches us that technology marches on 
and that new methods will rep 1 ace the old ones. 
But in the mean time, it does not behoove us to 
abandon a means of accomplishing space exploration 
because there are risks involved. The sensible 
approach is to manage the risks. 
The Working Group on the Use of Nuclear Power 
Sources in Outer Space, a subcommittee of COPUOS, 
was established in accordance with General Assembly 
Resolution 33/16 of November 10, 1978. The 
February 6, 1981 report of the Working Group 
reaffirmed that nuclear power sources can be used 
safely in outer space provided that all necessary 
safety requirements are met. 19 The report went on 
to recommend that the question of the use of 
nuclear power sources in outer space be retained as 
a priority item and that member States continue to 
carry out studies. 
And the Special Political Committee in its 18th 
meeting held in New York in November 1983 continued 
the lively debate on the use of nuclear power 
sources in outer space. Viri Pavlovsky of 
Czechos 1 ovak i a observed that to forego the use of 
nuclear power sources in space would be tantamount 
to establ ishing a barrier to scientific progress 
and would delay the exploration of space for 
peaceful purposes. 20 Sweden proposed that there be 
a moratorium until use is regulated)l Canada 
reaffirmed its concern on the issues of 
responsibility of states engaged in using NPS, 
adequate safety measures, and assistance to states 
affected. 22 Iraq felt there should be a minimum 
number and they should be in a prescribed orbit. 23 
Austria welcomed the format on notification of 
malfunctions and hoped there would soon be 
agreement on safety standards and assistance in 
case of accidents. 24 
The essence of the 1981 Working Group thoughts on 
safety procedures was that design should assure a 
high probability of successful launch, start of the 
operations in orbit, and, where use was intended 
for low earth orbit, successful boosting of the NPS 
to a higher decay orbit. If boosters were not 
successful, the system should be capable of 
dispersing the radioactive material so that if it 
reaches the earth, rad i at i on does not exceed the 
recommendations of the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection (ICRP) in Document Number 
26. Additionally, prior to launch, an assessment 
of the collective and individual dose equivalents 
must be carried out for all phases of the proposed 
space mission. The Working Group noted the ICRP 
recommends an annual dose equivalent for workers of 
50mSu (5 rem) who 1 e body dose and an annual dose 
equivalent limit for the most highly-exposed 
members of the pub 1 i c of 5mSu from allman-made 
sources. 25 
The United States safety regime includes an 
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel composed of 
three coordinators appointed by the Secretary of 
Defense (DOD), the Administrator of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and 
the Secretary of Energy (DOE). The Nuclear 
Regulatory Agency, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
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Administration also participate in these reviews. 
The safety review ascertains whether the risks 
associated with the use of NPS are commensurate 
with the benefits. The policy of the United States 
in using RTGs following SNAP 9A26 was to design the 
container so that all nuclear material would 
survive intact regardless of the nature of an 
accident. Reentry and impact on earth were 
specifically envisioned and this occurred on the 
May 18, 1968 launch of NIMBUS-Bl. The range 
officer aborted the launch at an altitude of 30 
kilometers over the Santa Barbara channel and the 
RTG capsu 1 es were recovered without inc ident. The 
US policy is to reduce the risks when using nuclear 
reactors. When SNAP lOA was 1 aunched in 1965 with 
a nuclear reactor, the following steps were taken: 
the reactor was launched in a subcritical mode, the 
reactor was designed to remain subcritical at or 
after impact should it reenter the atmosphere 
before startup, and reactor startup was delayed 
until it had reached orbit. The almost circul ar 
polar orbit should last some 4000 years before 
decay in the earth's atmosphere. Additionally, the 
nuclear reactor package was designed to disassemble 
on reentry.27 It, therefore, should pose no risk 
to earth. 
Design for safety, however, must include not only 
system design but also mission design. The methods 
to reduce risks include confinement and containment 
(used with RTGs), dilution and dispersion (nuclear 
reactors), delay and decay (boosting into a decay 
orbit), and possibly retrieval and reboost (using a 
vehicle like the shuttle).28 
The United States is now developing the Space Power 
Advanced Reactor (SPAR) power plant. It is being 
designed to have a power range of 10 to 100 
kilowatts with growth potential up to 400 
kilowatts. It is hoped that it will have a 
conversion efficiency of nine percent. The 
significance is that a 100-kilowatt SPAR may be 
able to deliver three times more payload to 
geosynchronous orbit than the three-stage chemical 
Inertial Upper Stage (IUS).29 Multimegawatt space 
reactors will most 1 ikely require a different set 
of technologies which are now being explored. A 
design concept shold be selected by 1991. 30 
SPACE CATALOGUE 
One of the missions of the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) is to maintain the 
catalogue of space objects. This requires over 
20,000 daily observations. The NORAD Space 
Surve ill ance Center (NSSC) ma i nta ins accurate 
positional data on all man-made objects in earth 
orbit. The primary function of this catalogue is 
to alert the NOR AD commander to a decaying space 
object so that it will not be mistaken for a 
reentering intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM). The Tracking Impact Prediction (TIP) 
program focuses attention on all space objects 
which are due to decay within 20 days--if there is 
greater than five percent possibility that the 
space object wi 11 survive reentry and strike the 
earth. This program considers debris which has a 
radar cross-section greater than one square meter 
and all payloads, rocket bodies, and platforms--
regardless of size. From the time that a decaying 
object comes under scrutiny, it is tracked 
carefully because its rate of decay is not exactly 
predictable--the more observations, the more 
accurate a prediction. A difficulty with 
predictions, however, is that space objects 
starting to decay may tumble and spin, causing 
their orbits to change more quickly than more 
stable orbiting bodies. Additionally, the earth's 
atmosphere has similar properties to a body of 
water which can cause some reentering space objects 
to "skip along the surface." 
The predominant factor which affects predictions, 
however, is the earth's weather and its effects on 
low earth orbit as space debris typically has no 
well-defined aerodynamic properties. An additional 
consideration is that the earth is not round; 
therefore, the gravitational pull of the earth 
varies as a satellite orbits. And the density of 
the atmosphere varies above the earth's surface so 
a satell ite encounters different amounts of drag 
during its orbit. 31 While there may come a point 
in time that technological breakthroughs will make 
reentering predictions more reliable, at the pres-
ent time there is a degree of error. The error 
factor in computations of the TIP program is plus 
or minus 20 percent from the time of the last 
observation to the time of the predicted decay. 
Therefore, as time passes, and the time for reentry 
comes closer, the window gets smaller. NOR AD very 
carefully tracked COSMOS 954 and 1402 parts 1 and 
2. I was in the NORAD Command Pos tin Cheyenne 
Mountain during the final hours of the COSMOS 1402 
decay and it was not until the two-hour point prior 
to impact that there was any degree of confidence 
that the landing would be benign. One minute is 
equal to roughly 300 miles. However, because of 
the poss i b il i ty that the reenter i ng space object 
might "skip," no official statements could be made 
as they could result in either a false sense of 
security or panic, depending upon the 
circumstances. 
SENSORS 
I nformat i on on COSMOS 954, COSMOS 1402, and other 
satell ites comes from dedicated sensors, contribu-
ting sensors, and collateral sensors. Dedicated 
sensors are those under the operational control of 
NORAD with a primary mission of space track 
support. These include NAVSPASUR, GEODSS, 
Baker-Nunn, and San Miguel. NAVSPASUR, or the 
United States Naval Space Surveillance System, is 
an electronic fence stretching 3000 miles across 
the southern Un ited States. It is located at 
approximately 33 degrees north latitude and detects 
a 11 space objects wh i ch break the plane of the 
screens. GEOOSS is the Ground Based 
Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System 
which has, as its name implies, the mission of 
supplying information on space objects a great 
distance from the earth. Sites are currently 
located in Soccoro, New Mexico; Taegu, Korea, and 
Maui, Hawaii. Two more are planned--one in Diego 
Garcia in the Indian Ocean and another in Portugal. 
The system is sophisticated--coup1ing an optical 
telescope, a low-light level television camera, and 
a computer. It does a highly complex operation 
very quickly; however, it must rely upon a clear, 
night sky. Thus poor weather impairs the qual ity 
and timel iness of GEODSS information necessary to 
update the catalogue. It is, however, capable of 
detecting and collecting data from 5000 to 35,000 
kilometers or more. Each site has three telescopes 
capable of performing search and track functions as 
well as space object identification. 
Baker-Nunn cameras are the predecessors of GEODSS 
and are being phased out. This system relied upon 
pho'tographs wh i ch had to be developed and then 
analyzed before the information could be passed to 
NORAO. However, without this approximate hour and 
a half delay, GEODSS can see an object 1000 times 
dimmer. In addition to GEOOSS, the tracking radar 
at San Miguel, Phil ippines, is also dedicated to 
space track support and the equ ipment there 
consists of a GPS-10 mechanical tracker. 
The contributing sensors are non-NORAO sensors 
which are under contract to the United States Air 
Force to provide space track support upon request. 
These mechanical trackers are located at Ascension 
Island; Antigua Island, Kwajalein Island; and Maui, 
Hawaii. 
The col1 atera1 sensors are under the operational 
control of NORAD, but their primary mission is 
other than space track. For example, the detection 
fans and mechanical trackers at the three Ballistic 
Missile Early Warning Sites (BMEWS) have as a 
primary mission missile warning and perform their 
space track function as a lesser priority. They 
are located at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and 
Fylingdales, England. 
Other co 11 atera 1 sensors include phased array 
radars at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Beale 
Air Force Base, California; Eglin Air Force Base, 
Florida; PARCS (Perimeter Acquisition Radar 
Characterization System) at Cavalier Air Force 
Station, North Dakota; and COBRA DANE on Shemya 
Island at the end of the Aleutian chain in Alaska. 
LAUNCH NOTICE 
Initial notice of a domestic launch comes from a 
report 15 days prior to launch. The "R-15 message" 
is prepared by the launch controll ing agency and 
includes nominal orbital elements, launch window, 
characteristics of each piece to achieve orbit, 
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launch vehicles, launch site, space track 
requirements, sequence of events, cataloging 
instructions, and communications frequencies. From 
this information a nominal element set is provided 
each sensor wh i ch is tasked to track and ver i fy a 
successfu 1 1 aunch with proper orb it. When 
requested by the launch agency this information is 
given in an Early Orbit Determination (EODET) 
report which requires additional support from the 
sensors. 
The first notification of many foreign launches 
comes from the Satellite Early Warning System 
(SEWS) which provides infrared information to the 
Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) at NORAD. 
Only after a satellite begins to orbit is it clear 
that it was not an ICBM that was being launched. 
The SPAOOC passes the launch information to the 
NSSC which then processes the information and 
includes it in the catalogue of space objects. 
Additionally, through Space Object Identification 
(SOl), the size, shape, motion, and orientation of 
satell ites is determined. Because of the 1 imited 
number of sensors, however, and the great number of 
space objects, priorities are established to ensure 
the most effective use of available assets. The 
highest priority is given to new foreign launches 
and satellites in the final stages of decay. These 
two categories are of immense interest to NORAD 
because both may be identified incorrectly as an 
ICBM pos i ng a threat to the North Amer i can 
cont i nent. 
U. S. international treaty obligations also demand 
close monitoring of decaying objects. NORAD 
carefully tracks a decaying space object which has 
a predicted point of impact plus or minus 15 
minutes or 100 nautical miles of the border of the 
USSR. Under the 1971 Agreement on Measures to 
Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between 
The United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Social ist Republ ics, such notification is 
prov i ded to ease tens ions and serves to reassure 
the Soviet Union that there is no hostile 
intent. 32 An additional reason to place a high 
priority on decaying objects which may strike the 
earth's surface is potential liability which may be 
incurred by the launching State. 33 
States who are parties to the Convention on 
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space~including in particular States possessing 
space monitoring and tracking facil ities," must 
respond "to the greatest extent feasible" to a 
request of a Party State unable to identify a space 
object that has caused damage to it or its 
nationals, for assistance in identification of the 
space object. 
The next level of priority is given to special 
events such as maneuvers, deorbits, domestic 
launches, and special tests and projects. Routine 
satell ites in orbit have third priority, ahead of 
the growing amount of debris. 
CALCULATIONS 
There are two kinds of computer calculations that 
the NSSC can do on a given space object. Both 
batch and sequential corrections are used to update 
the orbital element sets. Sequential corrections 
use the current element set plus new observation 
which results in a time weighing toward the new 
data. Batch corrections, on the other hand, use a 
greater number of observations, thereby eliminating 
a time weighing. However, weighing is permitted 
based upon sensor accuracy. Sequential corrections 
take less time to accompl ish because less data is 
used, but they may be flawed if used on other than 
stable orbits because one or more bad observations 
can distort the conclusion. 
Lower priority space objects in stable orbits lend 
themse 1 ves to automat i c process i ng. The computer 
runs a series of programs to save the orbital 
analysts' time. Essentially, if the object remains 
within acceptable perameters, the computer 
automatically updates the catalogue. If not, the 
particular object is flagged for an orbital 
analyst's evaluation. 
The catalogue of space objects started in 1957 and 
includes a total of 15,094 space objects. Of these 
9795 have decayed but 5299 are still in orbit. The 
United States has launched 524 payloads ... the USSR 
1161 payloads, and other nations 48.,,5 Large 
objects monitored by the TIP program come down at a 
rate of approximately 140 per year while smaller 
pieces come down at a rate of approximately 550 per 
year. As of 30 June 1984, the satell ite catalogue 
looked like this: 458 US earth orbiting satellites 
and 30 space probes; 785 Sovi et sate 11 i tes and 27 
space probes; 127 satellites from other nations and 
2 space probes. 36 The rema in i ng 3870 objects are 
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debris which range from rocket bodies to a camera 
from an Apollo launch. The catalogue now tracks 
space objects as small as a soccer ball at 22,300 
miles (geosynchronous).37 
DEBRIS 
The problem of debris has received some interest 
but little worldwide concern. The report of 
UNISPACE 82 held in Vienna, August 1982, noted, 
"While the probability of accidental collision with 
a '1 ive' space object is yet statistically small, 
it does exist and the continuation of present 
practices ensures that this probability will 
increase to unacceptable levels".38 V. A. 
Chobotov, in an excellent article, noted that 
debri s fl ux and the probab il ity of co 11 is i on is 
greatest in the 600-1200 km altitude range for 
polar and retrograde orbits in general. For 
geosynchronous satellites, the orbital 
concentration is a significant issue. The worst 
case probability of collision was 6X10-5yr (six in 
a mill i on per year) or two orders of magn itude 
greater than that for a typical geosynchronous 
sate 11 ite. He concluded that the probab i 1 ity of 
collision for a spacecraft in orbit is a function 
of altitude and orbit plane inclination, as well as 
longitudinal position for geostationing 
satellites. 39 
Simply stated, must we wait for this problem to 
come to worldwide public attention through a 
catastrophe before the technical and legal scholars 
come together to seek workable solutions? The 
problem of nuclear power sources would likely have 
remained just an intellectual concern were it not 
for COSMOS 954. As Moore and Leaphart note, media 
coverage has brought worldwide attention to 
sate 11 ite events and "these fall i ng 'stars' have 
captured the public's interest on a magnitude far 
beyond the significance of the harm caused.,,40 
Collision avoidance is, however, a prime way of 
solving the problem. NOR AD performs a COMBO 
(Computation of Miss Between Orbits) especially for 
the shuttle orbiter missions. The purpose is to 
assure that during launch and on orbit there is a 
safe separation of the shuttle orbiter from other 
space objects. Through the catalogue for space 
objects and the computer, a comparison is made 
between the fl ight path of the shuttle and other 
space objects. A point of closest approach (PCA) 
is determined and if a risk is presented, 
maneuver i ng cou 1 d be accomp 1 i shed. Co 11 is i on 
avoidance is also affected by proper preplanning of 
orbital locations. It is only through careful 
management of critical orbital paths and locations 
that safety can be enhanced. 
Debris can also be held to a mlnlmum by proper 
design of launch systems and the limiting of 
loosely attached mechanisms. For example, use of 
the shuttle orbiter rather than expendable launch 
vehicles (ELV) reduces the debris produced by 
multiple launches and eliminates rocket bodies with 
unspent fuel thereby reducing explosions which 
creat an instantaneous increase in debr is. Better 
design of satellites so they are more cohesive will 
also reduce debris. The use of disposal orbits, 
however, needs further study. As noted ear 1 i er, 
the USSR has used this technique for their 
satell ites with nuclear reactors. This program 
calls for boosting the reactor up to 900 to 1000 km 
altitude so that the radioactivity will be 
significantly lessened prior to decay and reentry 
through the earth's atmosphere some 1000 years from 
now. 41 
The ultimate solution for eliminating satellites 
that have completed their missions and debris is 
removal. 42 At the present time technology and 
costs make such efforts impractical. However, in 
the nature of things, such developments seldom take 
place until there is a viable need. Dean Olmstead 
at the International Astronautical Federation 
meeting in October 1983 presented a most 
interesting dilemma. 43 In order to effectively 
control debris, including "dead" satellites, there 
must either be an economic benefit that accrues to 
the launching agency or enforceable laws must be 
agreed to by the launching states. 44 He points out 
that extremely useful orbits such as geosynchronous 
do not "belong" to a using state because Articles I 
and II of the Outer Space Treaty provide that space 
shall be the province of all mankind and states may 
not establish claims of sovereignty over outer 
space or the moon and other celestial bodies. 45 
The other alternative, to create a system of 
enforceable laws to clean up debris, seems both 
politically difficult and almost impossible with 
current technologY. Olmstead's conclusion, with 
wh i ch I agree, is to create some sort of 1 imited 
property rights which would induce the using State 
to clean up its own house or, better yet, not 
litter it in the first place. 46 
The world must decide what the solution to the 
problem is now, before debris gets to a point that 
it jepardizes productive use of space. 
Authoritative enforcement to control the actions of 
people has usually been less than totally 
satisfactory and the application of similar efforts 
towards sovereign states has been less successful. 
There is an invitation to "cheat" when there is no 
sure method to verify the creation of all debris 
coupled with an absence of a meaningful regime to 
enforce compliance. Economic regimes on the other 
hand which reward efficient use of a resource are 
usually successful because they are self rewarding 
and, therefore, self policing. One invariably 
serves one's own self interests. 
An economic solution would lead a satellite owner 
to use the last of the fuel available to remove it 
from a usable orbit rather than leave it as debris. 
In a similar vein, cleaner launches would occur 
even if procured at a greater cost because the 
launching state would have an economic interest in 
the avoidance of debris. 
CONCLUSION 
We must learn from COSMOS 954 that, where risks 
exist, the world community must focus attention on 
viable solutions. We can not wait for a calamity 
or hope for new scientific insight before coming to 
grips with the problem. 
Nuclear power sources must be used judiciously and 
safe launches are a must. Criteria for a launch 
should emulate the safety procedures and techniques 
used for manned launches rather than expendable 
launched vehicles. If an NPS launch fails to reach 
orb it, the abort procedures shou I d ensure mi n ima 1 
radioactive risk. It is essential that nuclear 
reactors employ "cold launches" with the reactor 
not being activated until an altitude is reached 
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that assures minimal risk in the event of an 
unplanned return. 
The 1981 United Nations Working Group on NPS 
outl ined effective procedures for notification of 
errant vehicles so that affected states will be 
advised. There is no reason to believe that 
1 aunch i ng states will not prov ide such i nformat ion 
should the returning space vehicle pose a 
radiological hazard. 47 
A problem as critical as the use of nuclear power 
sources and the radiological hazard which they pose 
is the growing amount of space debris and uncleared 
launches. While the odds of an incident are 
extremely small now, the result of a collision may 
still be catastrophic. Should a manned vehicle be 
struck by a sizable space object, loss of 1 ife is 
almost certain. Thus, we need to turn our legal 
and scientific attention to the objects which are 
presently in space and the potential threat posed 
by a new launch striking a manned vehicle or 
working satellite. To avoid this latter 
possibility, a clearinghouse should be made 
available to all nations. 
States bear international responsibility under 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty for 
authorizing and supervising both their acts and the 
acts of non-governmental ent it i es 1 aunch i ng from 
their territory.48 Cooperation by all launching 
nations to ensure safe insertion of payloads into 
orb i t will not on 1 y reduce the potent i a 1 for 
liability but Significantly reduce the possibility 
of a more threatening international incident. 
The problems of debris can be ameliorated by 
cleaner launches and particularly the use of 
vehicles 1 ike the space shuttle which avoid 
multiple expendable launch vehicles. In the 
future, it may even be possible for laser 
technology to burn up debris in low earth orbit. 
At geosynchronous altitude, worn out satellites are 
growing in profusion. These "junk cars" strewn all 
over the road mus t be c I eared up. The presence of 
"dead" satellites may present a small risk but the 
potential economic loss should damage occur could 
be staggering. A regimen for avoiding this must be 
internationally devised. I recommend a solution 
involving 1 imited property rights to orbital 
pas it ions rather than a 1 aw enforcement approach. 
Whatever is to be done, it must be done now--before 
the "junk yard" is so filled that society loses 
this unique space resource. The use of space is 
clearly at the point where each state must be 
concerned with the launches and the debris created 
by others. It is no longer safe to act 
unilaterally. 
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Power 
Source1 
SNAP-3A 
SNAP-3A 
SNAP-9A 
SNAP-9A 
SNAP-9A 
SNAP-lOA 
(Reactor) 
SNAP-19B2 
SNAP-19B3 
SNAP-27 
SNAP-27 
SNAP-27 
SNAP-27 
SNAP-19 
SNAP-27 
TRANSIT -
RTG 
SNAP -27 
SNAP-19 
SNAP-19 
SNAP-19 
MHW 
MHW 
MHW 
MHW 
SUMMARY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS LAUNCHED BY THE U. S. A. 
(1961-1980) 
Spacecraft 
TRANSIT 4A 
TRANSIT 4B 
TRANSIT -5BN-1 
TRANSIT -5BN-2 
TRANSIT -5BN-3 
SNAPSHOT 
NIMBUS-B-1 
NUMBUS III 
APOLLO 12 
APOLLO l3 
APOLLO 14 
APOLLO 15 
PIONEER 10 
APOLLO 16 
"TRANSIT" 
(TRIAD-01-1X) 
APOLLO 17 
PIONEER 11 
VIKING 1 
VIKING 2 
LES 8 
LES 9 
VOYAGER 2 
VOYAGER 1 
Mission Type 
Navigational 
Navigational 
Navigational 
Navigational 
Navigational 
Experimental 
Meterological 
Meterological 
Lunar 
Lunar 
Lunar 
Lunar 
Planetary 
Lunar 
Navigational 
Lunar 
Planetary 
Mars 
Mars 
Communications 
Communications 
Planetary 
Planetary 
Launch Date 
June 29, 1961 
November 15, 1961 
September 28, 1963 
December 5, 1963 
April 21, 1964 
April 3, 1965 
May 18, 1968 
April 14, 1969 
November 14, 1969 
Apri 1 11, 1970 
January 31, 1971 
July 26, 1971 
March 2, 1972 
April 16, 1972 
September 2, 1972 
December 7, 1972 
April 5, 1973 
August 20, 1975 
September 9, 1975 
March 14, 1976 
March 14, 1976 
August 20, 1977 
September 5, 1977 
Status 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Mission aborted; burned up on reentry 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Mission aborted; heat source retrieved 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Successfully placed on lunar surface 
Mission aborted on way to moon. Heat 
source returned to south Pacific 
Ocean. 
Successfully placed on lunar surface 
Successfully placed on lunar surface 
Successfully operated to Jupiter and 
beyond 
Successfully placed on lunar surface 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Successfully placed on lunar surface 
Successfully operated to Jupiter and 
Saturn and beyond 
Successfully landed on Mars 
Successfully landed on Mars 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Successfully achieved orbit 
Successfully operated to Jupiter and 
Saturn and beyond 
Successfully operated to Jupiter and 
Saturn and beyond 
1SNAP stands for Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power. All odd-numbered SNAP power plants use radioisotope 
fuel. Even-numbered SNAP power plants have nuclear fission reactors as a source of heat. MHW stands for 
the Miltihundred Watt RTG. 
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